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1 Introduction 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is widely used to support system safety decision making by 
industry, regulators and government. QRA has been heavily criticised by academics ([1][2][3][4]), 
working engineers ([5][6]) and public welfare campaigners ([7][8]). Attempts to rebut the criticisms 
(e.g. Apostolakis [9]) rely on distinguishing “good” QRA from “bad” QRA, a review task which is 
itself a black art. Our perception is that QRA remains widely practiced because of inertia and 
uncertainty (benefit of the doubt), not because of justified belief in its validity. Our aims in this paper 
are to argue in support of this perception and to provide a maturity model that shows a path to 
justifiable QRA practice.   
QRA is used in many domains for many different purposes; in this paper we are solely concerned with 
its use in safety. We do not make claims about the utility or otherwise of QRA in other domains. Due 
to our focus on safety we are concerned with risk associated with hazards – states of the system which 
can cause harm, especially loss of life or injury, without anything else needing to go wrong. In some 
domains the term “risk scenario” is used; because of our focus on safety we use the term “hazard” 
throughout.  
In terms of years, QRA is a mature discipline – fault tree analysis has been in use since the 
Minuteman Missile and Boeing 747 development projects in the 1960s [10], and probabilistic nuclear 
safety assessment began at a similar time [11]. Actual maturity of science, however, does not come 
from age; it comes from revision and correction as weaknesses in theories and methods are identified 
and resolved. In this respect, QRA has led a charmed life – it has been subject to little empirical 
evaluation and little critical review. Empirical studies do not seem to have influenced the actual 
conduct of QRA [12]. Many instances of QRA are never tested: QRA is most important for assessing 
safety-critical behaviour in circumstances where we are very unwilling for the top event to happen 
even once (we do not tolerate nuclear meltdowns). When a QRA predicts that an accident will occur 
only every million years, not having that accident in a plant’s forty-year lifetime is negligible 
evidence that the QRA was correct. We thus have the combination of little empirical study with little 
natural feedback – a situation which leaves us in almost total darkness as to the validity and efficacy 
of QRA. 
An important question is thus “how can we make things better?” A key first step is to understand the 
flaws – to systematically understand the full breadth of ways in which QRA can go wrong. A second 
step is to understand the relative importance of those flaws so that we can prioritise research into 
them. 
In this paper, we first summarise the empirical evidence on the validity of QRA, and we show that it 
is inadequate given the strong claims that QRA users are making. We then present a comprehensive 
classification of possible flaws in QRA, drawing on those described in a wide range of published 
sources. We have assessed the validity of this error set by noting whether the flaws occur in a set of 
peer reviews of real-world risk assessments, or in our own industrial experience. While there are 
many previous “most important errors” or “most common error” lists (e.g. [7][13][14][15]), we are 
aware of no previous classification that even claims to be comprehensive. 
Our goal in this paper is not to add to the criticism of QRA. We provide instead a constructive way 
forward – a maturity model for assessing and improving QRA. In order to qualify for a given level, a 
QRA process and report must be free of the flaws in all levels below. By organising the flaws in this 
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way, our maturity model provides a roadmap both for organisations to develop their QRA practices 
and for researchers to target the most important real-world problems. 
2 There is Inadequate Empirical Support for Quantitative Risk 
Assessment 
2.1 We Believe that QRA is Valuable, but We Cannot Show It 
We will start by setting out some of our (the authors’) views on QRA, in order to set our assessment 
of practices in context. We believe that QRA, done well, probably helps people design safer systems. 
Furthermore, assessing the absolute size of risk is a necessary part of a well-regulated safety process, 
and by definition this activity is “QRA”. Therefore we cannot say “do not do QRA”; we can, 
however, say “be sceptical about the validity and hence value of any instance of QRA”. 
We will spell out in detail, through the rest of this section, what the evidence for and against QRA 
says. In summary, it suggests that: 
a) Effort should be placed on improving the quality of QRA performance, in particular on 
providing tools and mechanisms for review of QRA 
b) QRA should be used in ways that match its strengths - the focus of analysis should be on 
finding ways to manage risk 
c) QRA should not be used in ways that place excessive reliance on its accuracy 
d) We need more research into the quality and attributes of QRA as it is practiced 
Many of the flaws in QRA are equally applicable (and probably prevalent) in non-quantitative 
(qualitative) risk assessment. It is not our intent here to promote a qualitative alternative to QRA. 
In order to investigate QRA, we need to distinguish between several different concepts. 
1. The properties QRA has as a set of practices 
2. The properties of any specific instance of QRA (e.g. “the QRA performed on a proposed 
expansion of chemical plant X by safety consultancy Y between June and September 2009”) 
3. The properties shared by sets of specific examples of QRA (e.g. “large-scale QRAs in the UK 
chemical process industry between 2008 and 2013”) 
In order to investigate QRA, we will need to examine instances of QRA. Some QRA instances will be 
better than others, and specific criticisms levelled at QRA may be true for some instances but not for 
others. 
QRA, however, has a very definite existence beyond individual instances. There are frequent 
arguments about the benefits and drawbacks of QRA as a practice. QRA may be mandated or not 
mandated by standards and regulations. Empirically, there may be patterns and trends in the properties 
of QRA examples. There are statements which, if not necessarily true for “QRA” can be shown to be 
true for most or all instances of QRA. 
In these cases, the main question of concern from a big-picture perspective is “If people set out to do a 
QRA, are they likely to do it well in terms of the claims they will want to make?” If a claim cannot be 
shown to be true for QRA generally, or to be predominantly true in an identifiable set of QRA 
examples, then it is an unsupported claim. 
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QRA practices vary according to the competency of QRA practitioners and between industry sectors. 
At present there is no research which examines properties common to QRA instances in specific 
sectors. One of the goals of this paper is to facilitate such research by allowing QRA instances to be 
measured against a common framework. 
2.2 There are Strong Claims Made about QRA  
There is no academic or industrial source which spells out all the properties that QRA as a tool must 
have in order to be fit for purpose. Guidance is available on the form and content of that individual 
QRA examples should follow, and on errors to be avoided, but this falls short of stating clearly what 
QRA should achieve. However, we can infer the required properties by looking at how QRA is used 
and what people say about QRA, and then capture these properties in the form of the claims that users 
make about QRA. Sometimes these claims are explicit, but often they are implicit. For example, if a 
risk assessment report states that a QRA was presented to a public focus group and that the group 
found the risk distribution acceptable, then it is making the implicit claim that the focus group could 
understand the QRA well enough to make that judgement. Once we have a clearly-defined set of 
claims, we can examine whether they are supported or refuted by the available evidence, and thereby 
assess whether the use of QRA is actually justified. 
To identify suitable claims we surveyed a collection of real-world risk assessment reports [16] and 
noted the self-identified purpose of the reports. Activities making use of QRA include: 
1. Classifying risk (usually for the purpose of regulating a substance or technology) 
2. Reacting to public concern regarding a known or suggested risk 
3. Identifying ways to improve a design  
4. Selecting between competing designs 
5. Comparing risk with pre-defined targets 
6. Trading-off risk against other concerns 
7. Tracking changes in risk over time 
8. Accepting or declining risk as a public policy decision 
Of course, QRA are rarely used alone – they are typically used in tandem with qualitative analyses, 
operational experience reports, and expert judgement. The value of a given QRA partly depends on 
this context; it also depends on its suitability to benefit from the context – for example, if a QRA has 
weaknesses that other methods can compensate for, that potentially enables that QRA to be used 
effectively, but it needs to be clear from the QRA artefacts and activities that it does indeed have 
those weaknesses. If the weaknesses are not clear, the complementary activities may never be 
performed, or their results never checked for those issues. 
For example, in activity 4 (“Selecting between competing designs”), analysts might proceed by 
building a quantitative model (such as a set of fault trees) for each competing design, then calculating 
the safety risk posed by each of them. These quantitative models would seldom be the sole basis for 
the decision. For example, a qualitative common-cause analysis could explore issues of inter-
dependence and systematic failure, and design reviews could examine compliance with standards and 
regulations. These analyses would feed into the decision-making process, where safety would be one 
factor to be weighted and considered against competing concerns such as cost, time to market, and 
non-safety performance. 
Similarly, in activity 5 (“Comparing risk with pre-defined targets”), analysts would model in an 
appropriate quantitative form and analyse the model to determine the overall risk. They could then 
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compare the estimated risk with the defined target(s). The target might be a fixed system risk criteria 
such as “1 × 10-6 fatal accidents per hour” or a more complex criterion that would require further 
analysis (e.g. the ALARP criterion in the UK, whereby overall risk must be below some target and 
reduced by any means that is reasonably practicable). Quantitative targets are seldom the sole risk 
acceptance criterion; QRA informs but does not fully determine risk acceptability.  
Although any individual use of QRA cannot be considered in isolation of other engineering activities, 
in order to provide a useful assessment of QRA and to develop our maturity model, for the rest of this 
paper we will focus on the properties of QRA itself. We start by considering the claims made for 
QRA.  
We have identified the following set of important claims, ordered from the strongest to the weakest, in 
terms of claimed contribution of QRA to safety: 
1. The Real-world Accuracy Claim – the aggregated estimate of total system risk (the “top 
number” in fault tree terminology) is sufficiently accurate and precise to allow correct 
decisions to be made (for example by comparing estimated risk against acceptable levels 
or targets). This claim arises from the use of QRA to support activities 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8. 
 
2. The Cost-effective Usefulness Claim – performing QRA provides a safety benefit that is 
measurably better than that provided by similar non-quantified risk assessment activities 
(e.g. greater insight into the dangerous behaviour of the system). This claim arises from 
the use of QRA to support activities 3, 4, 6, and 7.  
 
3. The Usefulness Claim – QRA provides a benefit, but we can’t say that it’s more important 
than non-quantified “rivals”. (This is the fall-back claim, which leaves QRA with some 
value, but no special status amongst safety techniques.) 
 
Our claims are not the only way to evaluate QRA. There is a rich vein of literature theorising about 
what it means for QRA to be valid; Aven [17] provides a useful summary of the different 
perspectives. For example, Aven and Heide [18] discuss the requirements QRA must meet to be 
considered a “scientific method”. Aven and Heide’s “V1” definition of risk assessment validity – “the 
degree to which the produced risk numbers are accurate compared to the underlying true risk” – 
corresponds to our first claim. There are ways, however, that QRA can be scientific without making 
accurate predictions of real world risk. For example, under Aven and Heide’s “V2” criterion, 
scientific validity can arise because the “assigned probabilities adequately describe the assessor’s 
uncertainties of the unknown quantities considered”. 
 
The claims we address here consider QRA as an engineering method, rather than a scientific method. 
Engineering methods are equally subject to scientific investigation, but are evaluated according to 
their usefulness in achieving engineering goals. Thus, although we share with Aven and Heide a 
concern with claims of real-world accuracy, we then move on to explicit usefulness claims rather than 
alternative claims of scientific validity. 
 
For all of the claims, the benefit provided by QRA is ultimately to help make better decisions. For 
Real-World Accuracy, this is a simple “value of information” proposition – accurate knowledge of 
risk allows much better decisions in many of the activities listed earlier. For the other two claims, 
there are a variety of ways in which QRA can potentially improve decisions, such as facilitating 
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communication between stakeholders or highlighting areas of uncertainty. These are discussed further 
in sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
 
We carried out an organized search for literature that empirically addresses the above claims. We did 
this in two stages. First, we searched the web for paired keywords: in each search one keyword was 
“QRA” or the name of a specific QRA technique, and the second keyword referred to one of the 
claims or to evidence gathering and evaluation (e.g. “validation”, “empirical”, “effectiveness”). 
Second, we conducted a manual search by using queries on mailing lists and by following citations 
from papers that advocated QRA or specific QRA techniques.  
Our previous work on system safety research validation [19] suggested that there was very little 
research on the fitness-for-purpose of safety techniques generally. This was borne out in this more 
structured search – there is very little direct evidence that speaks for or against QRA meeting the 
claims. In fact, the little work directly on the topic just discusses the lack of evidence rather than 
providing evidence in either direction. Manion [20] discusses the evidence basis for Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), but he makes only one direct statement about FTA performance – he claims that that 
fault trees underestimate risk “often by many orders of magnitude”. This turns out to be a hypothetical 
assertion from Mauri [21] rather than an evidenced claim. McDermid [22] observes that loss events in 
large-scale information technology systems are seldom anticipated by risk assessment. Danielsson 
[23] discusses quantitative models for financial risk assessment, and comes to similar conclusions to 
us; the paucity of evidence for QRA is not confined to system safety, so it appears that problems with 
QRA are not purely the product of unique challenges of the safety domain.  
In the following three sections we discuss each claim in turn, identify how each claim might be 
supported by evidence, and compare the extant evidence compares with that standard. 
2.3 The Real-World Accuracy Claim is False 
2.3.1 The Nature of the Accuracy Claim 
To establish the Real-world Accuracy Claim, we need to address the question “How accurate must 
the risk estimate be?”  
A quantified risk is (or at least should be) a probability distribution. A typical presentation includes a 
mean with confidence intervals above and below that mean. For example, we might say that the 
probability of a reactor leak is 1 x 10
-6
 per operating year, with 95% confidence that the upper bound 
is 1 x 10
-5
 per operating year. In cases where the distribution is not stated, it may still be implied 
(albeit weakly) by the number of significant figures used to state the mean.  
Aven and Heide [18] point out that wide confidence intervals are incompatible with high validity, but 
caution that determining what constitutes an acceptable confidence interval is context dependent. The 
way QRA is used can provide this context. In the case where QRA is used to justify that the risk 
posed by a system is less than some target, the total error must be less than the margin between the 
estimated risk and the risk limit. For example, if an aircraft system must exhibit a dangerous fault less 
than 1 x 10
-6
 per flight hour, and is estimated to exhibit such faults at a rate of 8 x 10
-7
 per flight hour, 
then the error must be less than 2 x 10
-7
 per flight hour. Otherwise, the QRA could appear to show that 
an unsatisfactory system met the target.  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG 1150 [24] evaluated five reactors against a target 
probability for an “individual early fatality per reactor year” of 5 x 10-6. Using 95% confidence 
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intervals, the probability estimate for two of the reactors was 5 x 10
-7
. This required the estimate to be 
precise within one order of magnitude to avoid false re-assurance that the target was met.  
The earlier WASH-1400 report [25] included frequencies for some events of 9 x 10
-7
 per reactor per 
year. No threshold comparison was made, but there was an implied claim in stating the 9 x 10
-7
 figure 
that the methods used were capable of measuring the risk so precisely.  
Not all quantitative risk assessments use a probability as the top number. For example, the 
environmental impact of chemicals is typically estimated as an expected population dose. If the 
expected dose approaches the level likely to cause harm to some portion of the population, the risk is 
unacceptable. The question of precision applies equally in this case. The estimate of expected dose 
must be more accurate than the distance between it and the dangerous level.  
2.3.2 Support for the Accuracy Claim 
The nature of QRA does make it very difficult to evaluate risk estimates empirically. Ideally, we 
would want to perform controlled trials with many replications of the same project in parallel, with an 
independent way of measuring the actual associated risk (perhaps by operating each resulting system 
for 30 years and monitoring the accidents and incidents that occur). If the risk estimates from QRA 
were tolerably close to the risk inferred from our monitoring, we could conclude that the real-world 
accuracy claim broadly holds. 
It is of course not practical to do such experiments, at least not for real projects on real systems. As 
Weinberg, quoted in Aven and Heide [18] puts it “one of the most powerful methods of science – 
experimental observations – is inapplicable to the estimation of overall risk”. This is not, of itself, an 
argument against using QRA, but it does show the difficulty of directly evaluating the accuracy of 
claims.  
In the case of accuracy, there is fortunately a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition which can 
and has been empirically investigated. Before any method can be accurate, it must first be precise – 
QRA is not useful if the correct answer lies somewhere within a very wide band of probabilities. 
Before any method can be precise, it must first be reliable: the same method applied by different 
people or at different times should give very similar results (Aven and Heide describe this as “R2” 
reliability [18]). If such multiple applications give significantly different results, this places an upper 
bound on how accurate that method can be. Studies of the reliability of QRA can thus rebut (but not 
confirm) the accuracy claim. 
The benchmark exercises reported by Amendola [26], Markert [27] and Fabbri [28] involved multiple 
teams assessing the risk of reference plants and scenarios. The purpose of all of these studies was to 
examine how QRA application varied between countries, and to identify sources of variability, with 
the extent of variability revealed as a by-product of each investigation. These exercises consistently 
showed variations over multiple orders of magnitude (as many as six orders, with differences over 
three orders of magnitude common) for teams with the same source data analysing the likelihood of 
the same top event (civilian deaths from gas release).  Teams in these studies used common data, but 
had a choice of which QRA methods they used. 
This is strong evidence that QRA is not reliable, and therefore not accurate. We were unable to find 
any studies that contradict the outcomes of the benchmark exercises. 
There are a small number of studies that address accuracy directly, comparing estimations with 
outcomes. These are necessarily high-frequency outcomes, typically sub-system events as part of a 
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larger QRA exercise. Examples include the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission reliability 
updates [29], and the NASA space shuttle probabilistic risk assessment [30]. The NRC studies 
explicitly use the outcomes as inputs into larger QRA calculations, and so cannot be considered stand-
alone evidence of QRA accuracy.  
Our conclusions above are consistent with the theoretical analysis of Aven and Heide [18], which 
concludes that the real-world accuracy claim (in their terms, “V1 validity”) is unlikely to be met in 
practice for the traditional relative-frequency approach in which the claim is couched. Aven and 
Heide also observe that it will definitely not be met by alternative probability of frequency 
approaches. 
2.4 The Cost-Effective Usefulness Claim is Unsupported 
2.4.1 Establishing a Cost-Effective Usefulness Claim 
The core question here is “Does QRA Lead to Safer Systems Even When the Top Number is Not 
Accurate?” Using numbers could be useful, even if the numbers themselves are not accurate. In 2004, 
Apostolakis presented an enthusiastic defence of QRA in response to popular press scepticism [9]. 
Notably, he chose specifically not to defend the quantification of aggregate risk, instead pointing to 
the improvements in safety that may arise from performing the analysis. This is not to say that safety 
improvement is a side-effect of quantification – it may be the direct and most important result of 
trying to quantify safety. Apostolakis suggests that quantification was necessary: 
 to appropriately prioritise risk from different scenarios; 
 to facilitate communication between stakeholders; 
 to integrate information from different academic disciplines; and 
 to highlight areas of uncertainty where more information or research is necessary. 
We can note that the reliability requirement from section 2.3.2 only applies to the real-world accuracy 
claim discussed in that section – there may be many valid ways to perform a given QRA, and for any 
given system there could be several quite different quantitative models where each provides valuable 
safety insights. In a set of QRAs for the same system that produced wildly varying overall risk 
estimates, each QRA might provide useful information to the safety process. Indeed, commissioning 
multiple QRAs from practitioners with varying backgrounds and expertise might be a cost-effective 
way to gain safety knowledge. 
How would we know if QRA was cost-effectively useful? To support this claim we would need a way 
to measure the usefulness and costs of risk-assessment relative to other safety activities. Measuring 
the usefulness of risk-assessment is not straightforward, particularly in the absence of measurements 
for absolute safety. If we could trust QRA to tell us how safe a system is, then we could also measure 
whether particular activities or design changes increased or decreased safety. It is the responsibility of 
those making claims of usefulness to provide mechanisms for measuring those claims.  
An example of good practice in this regard is Alexander and Kelly [31], which proposes enumeration 
of unique causal chains as a measure of the effectiveness of hazard analysis. Demonstrating that it is 
the method (rather than the skill of the risk assessor) delivering the benefit would require application 
of methods in controlled circumstances.  
2.4.2 Support for the Cost-Effective Usefulness Claim 
Whilst cost-effective usefulness is plausible for the reasons given above, it has not been scientifically 
tested. Practitioners of QRA perceive value arising from the quantification, but this is in the absence 
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of any control that would allow their perception to be tested. In other words the cost-effective 
usefulness claim is not proven, but it is not refuted either. As we have rejected the real-world accuracy 
claim above, this is the strongest claim that might be made for QRA. 
QRA may, of course, be cost-effective in terms of non-safety benefits, but that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
2.5 The (Mere) Usefulness Claim is Plausible, but Unhelpful 
To establish that QRA provides some value but is unremarkable amongst safety techniques, we 
merely need to identify means by which it can and does contribute to safety knowledge.  Possible 
mechanisms for this were listed in section 2.4.1 above. 
Usefulness without cost-effectiveness is of limited value, since a technique with poor return on 
investment can reduce the overall effectiveness of a safety program. QRA techniques are elaborate, 
time-consuming and expensive; if mere usefulness were the only claim about QRA that could be 
supported, the practice of QRA would be difficult to defend.  
2.6 Standards are Useful but Insufficient for Supporting Claims about QRA 
As noted in Section 2.1 above, if any of the claims about QRA in general (real-world accuracy, cost-
effective usefulness, usefulness) were true, this would not necessarily mean that any given QRA 
report had these properties. Contrariwise, identification of flaws in QRA in general does not mean that 
any specific QRA is flawed. In fact, many of the criticisms of QRA are based on errors in the practice 
of QRA, and many of the defences of QRA blame misuse of QRA for perceived problems; 
Apostolakis [9] and Aven [32] are simultaneously defenders of appropriate QRA and critics of  QRA 
misuse.   
How can we tell if a particular QRA is a “good QRA” or a “bad QRA”? Apostolakis argues for the 
central role of quality review [9]; Alexander and Kelly make a similar argument [33]. This raises 
important questions about the effectiveness of risk assessment review.  
 
The nature of QRA means that we cannot check its results directly; we need results in advance of 
events, and indeed we need estimates for events that will probably never occur. We therefore have to 
rely on process claims – claims that we have performed QRA in such a way that it will give 
trustworthy results. When we rely on process claims, we are justifying our risk estimates on the basis 
of arguments about QRA in general and experience with QRA on projects in the past. We thus need 
confidence that we have conducted QRA well. 
There are a number of sources we can turn to for quality review of QRA. ASME RA-S2008 provides 
technical requirements for nuclear power plant risk assessments [34]. With a few exceptions these 
requirements are generic – that is, they could be applied to QRAs beyond the nuclear power industry. 
The focus of the requirements is ensuring that the QRA is documented in enough detail to support 
expert peer review. The Swiss nuclear standard ENSI-A05e [35] is more nuclear-specific, providing 
detailed guidance on power plant failure scenarios. Both of these standards implicitly consider what 
can go wrong with risk assessment – the choice of topics for requirements indicate concerns about 
flaws such as incorrect scope, incomplete hazard identification, poor elicitation of expert opinion, 
poor choice of component data, and unsupported estimates of human error.  
The European Rail Common Safety Method [36] creates a requirement for explicit risk assessment, 
and provides some guidance on the conduct of risk assessment. This guidance is at a very high level – 
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it provides basic instruction as to risk assessment should be performed rather than warning against 
specific flaws. 
QRA for offshore oil and gas installations is supported by the Centre for Marine and Petroleum 
Technology (CMPT) guide [37]. This guidance focuses on estimating risk for specific scenarios such 
as blowouts, leaks, fires and evacuations. Some detailed quality information is included, particularly 
with respect to uncertainty analysis.  
Following high-quality guidance material is likely to result in higher-quality instances of QRA. This 
is particularly the case when guidance is tailored to the concerns and common errors of a particular 
industry. However, complying with guidance is not in itself sufficient to ensure that a QRA is free of 
major flaws. All of the guidance described here emphasises the importance of expert peer review as a 
quality-control measure. Whether a particular instance of QRA satisfies the requirements and intent of 
ASMI RA-S2008, for example, can only be determined as a matter of expert judgement.  
Such judgement is difficult because risk assessment is prone to subtle error. The textbook 
“Misconceptions of Risk” by Terje Aven [38] details nineteen fundamental misunderstandings 
capable of undermining an assessment. These misconceptions are not straw men – we have witnessed 
many of these misunderstandings in industrial practice. Hansson [13] reports similar misconceptions 
from his own experience. 
Distinguishing between good QRA and bad QRA is the primary motivation for our maturity model for 
risk assessments.  
3 We Have Built a Maturity Model for QRA 
To address the concerns raised in the last section, we can make three pertinent observations. First, we 
can make most effective progress with the problem if we can prioritise the research that is needed. If 
we find different levels of empirical evidence of specific problems, we will then, similarly, need to 
prioritise improvements to fix those problems which occur most often (or with the greatest negative 
impact). 
Second, much empirical research on QRA will necessarily involve examining and evaluating real risk 
assessments. We therefore need ways to judge risk assessments when we review them. 
Finally, many general concerns about the validity of QRA can be assuaged for a single risk 
assessment. A risk assessor can state “My risk assessment doesn’t have that problem”, and argue their 
case. To support this, however, we need a comprehensive list of problems to look for. 
We could benefit, therefore, from a comprehensive classification of possible flaws in QRA. Such a 
classification could be arranged into levels of importance, thus allowing researchers and practitioners 
to prioritise their remedial actions. We have developed just such a scheme, and present it in this 
section. 
3.1 There is a common set of processes used in QRA 
In order to describe what can go wrong with risk assessment, we first describe what a risk assessment 
should be. Our description of the risk assessment processes is taken from a combination of sources. 
These include the National Academy’s “Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence” [39], the Swiss 
Nuclear Safety Inspectorate standard for Probabilistic Safety Analysis [35], the European Rail 
Common Safety Method (CSM) [36], and the EuroControl ESARR 4 [40].  
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There are eight primary processes making up a typical risk assessment, each with several sub-
processes. All of the processes must be present and correct for a complete risk assessment. The 
processes are: 
 Provide resources (manage competency, select participants, select tools) 
 Establish context (define scope, define system boundary, determine evaluation criteria) 
 Identify dangerous outcomes (select identification methods, determine significant events and 
states) 
 Build models (select modelling paradigm, build system-specific models, validate qualitative 
dynamics of models) 
 Estimate risk (select data sources, evaluate data quality, populate models with data, 
execute/analyse models, capture results, describe risk (including uncertainties)) 
 Evaluate risk (characterise decision, select preferred option) 
 Plan actions (fulfil assumptions, monitor estimates, reduce uncertainty, plan updates) 
 Communicate results (record process, report residual risk, report limitations) 
 
This is not a stage model – it is a list of processes that will be performed somewhat in parallel. It 
intentionally says nothing about necessary ordering – there are many possible orderings, interleavings 
and repetitions, and in any case knowledge of ordering is not needed for our purposes. All we need is 
a list of activities so that we can identify the flaws that can emerge from each of the activities. Our 
identification of flaws does not follow this list of activities; instead we used it as a prompt for 
organising the maturity model, for example by showing how to group cognate issues.  
3.2 We can derive a maturity model by identifying the possible flaws in 
each process 
Critiques of the practice (as opposed to the in-principle effectiveness) of QRA fall into four broad 
categories: 
1. Failure to develop appropriate causal models (see for example Manion [20]) 
2. Failure to determine appropriate input parameters (see for example Gadd [15]) 
3. Failure to appropriately communicate and apply the results of QRA, particularly with respect 
to uncertainty in the results (see for example Montague [41]) 
4. Failure to ensure that the results of the QRA stay valid throughout the period it is used for 
(see for example Rae and Nicholson [42]) 
We derived the basics of our maturity model by applying these concerns to the needs of each QRA 
process step. We then decomposed these broad concerns into more specific flaws by an iterative 
process, drawing on standards and guidelines for the conduct of risk assessment, academic literature 
describing errors in risk assessments, published peer reviews of risk assessments, and our combined 
experience in review of risk assessments. 
Flaws are assigned to levels based on our assessment of their power to undermine a risk assessment 
exercise. The levels are akin to the maturity levels of CMM or SPICE from software engineering 
management, in that increasing level indicates a better risk assessment, and that attaining a higher 
level requires avoiding the flaws at lower levels. We do not intend, however, to align this model 
directly with the CMM or SPICE scheme – our purposes are different to theirs. At this stage the 
maturity model is a hypothesis; in the same way that the adequacy of QRA has been evaluated in this 
paper, our maturity model will need evaluation (see Section 3.4).  
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Level One – Unrepeatable 
At this level the record of the risk assessment is incomplete. It is not possible to reconstruct how the 
risk assessment was performed in sufficient detail to tell if it was or was not performed appropriately. 
Until these flaws are corrected, higher-level problems cannot be recognised, let alone corrected. As 
we observe elsewhere, a great many problems with QRAs are primarily problems with QRA 
documentation; if nothing else, a fully-documented but otherwise flawed QRA can be safely used for 
some purposes by a competent engineer who takes due account of the flaws; an inadequately 
documented QRA cannot be safely used by anyone. 
The Level One flaws are listed in Table 1. Further discussion of these flaws is in Section 3.3. In 
principle, any one of the flaws is sufficient to make a QRA level one, but often analyses at this level 
exhibit many of these flaws. 
Table 1 – Maturity Level One Flaws 
Identifier Flaw Category Specific Flaw 
1.1 Failure to describe source material (discussed in section 3.3.1) 
1.1a  No information provided about source material 
1.1b  No unique identifier for versioned source material (e.g. system 
descriptions) 
1.1c  Reference to source material that is not available 
1.2 Failure to describe scope and objectives (discussed in section 3.3.2) 
1.2a  Purpose of the risk assessment is unstated 
1.2b  System boundary is not described 
1.2c  Scope of the risk assessment is unstated 
1.2d  Evaluation criteria are unstated 
1.3 Failure to report methods (discussed in section 3.3.3) 
1.3a  Methods are not described (or description is incomplete) 
1.3b  Method description is unclear or ambiguous 
1.4 Failure to report results (discussed in section 3.3.4) 
1.4a  Conclusions and recommendations are ambiguous 
1.4b  Conclusions and recommendations are incomplete 
1.4c  Conclusions and recommendations are not quantified (when 
quantification is required or appropriate) 
 
Level Two – Invalid 
At this level the uncertainty due to flaws in the analysis greatly outweighs the underlying uncertainty 
being investigated. In other words, the noise is greater than the signal. Contrast this with Level Three 
where the signal is starting to emerge from the noise and with Level Four where the residual 
uncertainty is mostly from the underlying data and scientific knowledge. It is probable that correcting 
Level Two flaws will reveal other serious problems with the risk assessment.  
It can be observed that while the Level One flaws were primarily concerned with documentation and 
presentation of results, at this level a number of substantive process failures appear. Where Level Two 
flaws do concern documentation (e.g. 2.3a and 2.7) they can often be resolved from the report alone, 
in contrast to the Level One flaws which generally require additional information to resolve. 
The Level Two flaws are listed in Table 2. Detailed discussion of the flaws is in Section 3.3. 
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Table 2 - Maturity Level Two Flaws 
Identifier Flaw Category Specific Flaw 
2.1 Major problems with source data (discussed in section 3.3.5) 
2.1a  Available data is not used 
2.1b  Unrealistic or inappropriate data is used 
2.1c  Assumptions (including model parameters, amounts of 
hazardous material, size of environmental effects) are 
inconsistent with available information 
2.2 Major omissions in the analysis where not explicitly excluded by the scope (discussed in section 
3.3.6) 
2.2a  External events are not considered (e.g. natural disasters) 
2.2b  Human contribution to accident sequences is not considered 
2.2c  Software contribution to accident sequences is not considered 
2.2d  Organisational failures are not considered 
2.2e  Only some operations are considered (e.g. ignoring start-up, 
maintenance, disposal) 
2.2f  Only some physical or causal pathways are considered 
2.2g  Only some outcomes are considered 
2.3 Mismatch between the risk assessment and reality (discussed in section 3.3.7) 
2.3a  Recommendations for action are inconsistent with assumptions 
in the risk assessment 
2.3b  Risk assessment has been performed on an incorrect or 
misunderstood description of the system 
2.3c  Invalid assumptions are made about the detectability of 
problems 
2.3d  Invalid assumptions are made about the effectiveness of 
mitigations 
2.3e  The required or designed behaviour of the system is assumed to 
be safe 
2.4 Major inaccuracies in the analysis (discussed in section 3.3.8) 
2.4a  Models are used outside their valid scope (including using 
models with little or no validity) 
2.4b  Factors that significantly increase or decrease risk for specific 
groups, locations, or times are ignored (including effects of 
system ageing) 
2.4c  Methods or models are applied incorrectly 
2.5 Internal inconsistency (discussed in section 3.3.9) 
2.5a  Different assumptions or data are used at different points in the 
analysis 
2.5b  Incorrect model elements are used (e.g. wrong logical operators) 
2.5c  Dissimilar elements are grouped together (e.g. treating 
components with different failure modes as if they are identical) 
2.6 Incorrect evaluation (discussed in section 3.3.10) 
2.6a  Risk acceptance criteria (e.g. ALARP, GAMAB) are applied 
incorrectly 
2.6b  Alternatives (including mitigations) are not considered in 
framing decisions 
2.6c  Alternatives (e.g. as required by ALARP) are not correctly 
costed 
2.6d  The cumulative effects of risks or mitigations are not considered 
2.7 Misleading conclusions (discussed in section 3.3.11) 
2.7a  Conclusions do not match the detail of the report 
2.7b  Qualitative descriptions of risk do not match the quantitative 
descriptions 
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2.8 Failure to report limitations (discussed in section 3.3.12) 
2.8a  Uncertainty is not reported 
2.8b  Limitations or restrictions on the validity of the assessment are 
not reported 
2.8c  The effect of assumptions on the outcome of the assessment is 
not reported 
2.9 Systematic problems with the conduct of the analysis (discussed in section 3.3.13) 
2.9a  Affected stakeholders have not been consulted 
2.9b  People with specialist knowledge (designers, maintainers, 
operators of equipment) have not been consulted 
2.9c  Intermediate or final results are obviously unrealistic (e.g. 
calculated frequencies of outcomes significantly lower than 
known actual frequency of outcomes) 
2.9d  Intermediate or final results are obviously contrived (e.g. 
exactly meeting externally specified risk targets) 
2.9e  Peer review has not been conducted 
2.9f  Risk assessment answers the wrong question e.g. by limiting 
scope inappropriately 
 
Level 3 – Valid but inaccurate 
At this level the uncertainty due to flaws in the analysis is probably comparable to the underlying 
uncertainty being investigated. It has some basic flaws that can be fixed, and it is probable that each 
of these flaws can be fixed individually without revealing further major errors. In other words, it is 
possible for a Level Three analysis to give a somewhat accurate picture of actual risk; the flaws may 
distort the result, but they are unlikely to dominate it. 
The level three flaws are listed in Table 3. Detailed discussion of these flaws is in Section 3.3.  
Table 3 - Maturity Level Three Flaws 
Identifier Flaw Category Specific Flaw 
3.1 Insufficient rigour in selecting source data (discussed in section 3.3.14) 
3.1a  Insufficient use has been made of system/location specific data 
(when such data is available and of suitable quality) 
3.1b  Insufficient use has been made of industry/generic data (when 
such data is of higher quality than the available system/location 
specific data) 
3.1c  The choice of data sources is too restricted (including failure to 
use analogous data where appropriate) 
3.1d  Historic data has been used without consideration of its 
applicability 
3.1e  The rules used to select or reject scientific data are not described 
3.1f  Estimates based on analysis (e.g. human error, software 
reliability) are derived inappropriately (e.g. human error 
estimate fails to consider performance-shaping factors) 
3.1g  Insufficient rigour in the elicitation and use of expert opinion 
3.2 Incorrect processing of data (discussed in section 3.3.15) 
3.2a  The tools or models used are unsuitable to the type of data 
3.2b  Averaging of data is performed or used inappropriately 
3.2c  Probability distributions are applied inappropriately 
3.2d  Dependencies between events or components are treated 
incorrectly (including false assumptions of independence) 
3.2e  Calculations are performed incorrectly 
3.2f  The selection of methods or models is insufficiently justified 
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3.3 Insufficient characterization of uncertainty (discussed in section 3.3.16) 
3.3a  Uncertainty in input data is inadequately characterised 
3.3b  The effects of assumptions and uncertainty are not propagated 
through the assessment 
3.3c  Epistemic uncertainty is not considered (for example 
unreliability of methods and models) 
3.3d  Rival system models (and the resulting uncertainty) are not 
considered 
3.4 Shortfalls in conclusions and recommendations (discussed in section 3.3.17) 
3.4a  Comparisons or context to facilitate interpretation of 
quantitative conclusions are not provided 
3.4b  The recommendations do not include tracking of assumptions 
(including monitoring the existence and effectiveness of risk 
mitigations)  
3.4c  The recommendations do not provide for the empirical 
confirmation of conclusions, estimates and assumptions where 
needed 
3.4d  The recommendations do not provide mechanisms for the risk 
assessment to remain current 
3.4e  Inappropriate (or no) weighting is provided when the report 
contains multiple conclusions or recommendations 
 
Level 4 – Accurate but Challengeable 
At this level reasonable and competent people can legitimately disagree about some features of the 
risk assessment. The existing state of data and scientific knowledge is insufficient to determine which 
opinion is more valid. 
In Table 4, which lists the Level Four flaws, the term “controversial” has been used to indicate issues 
where legitimate disagreement between experts is likely.  
Table 4 - Maturity Level Four Flaws 
Identifier Flaw Category Specific Flaw 
4.1 Disputed data sources (discussed in section 3.3.18) 
4.1a  The decision to include or exclude specific data or data sources 
is controversial 
4.1b  The relative weight given to data from different sources is 
controversial 
4.1c  The extrapolation of data is controversial 
4.1d  The interpretation of data from analogous systems, substances 
or environments is controversial 
4.2 Insufficient scientific knowledge (discussed in section 3.3.19) 
4.2a  Assumptions are unsupported, where no credible source is 
available to support or reject the assumption 
4.2b  There are suspected failure/harm mechanisms other than those 
in the risk assessment, where no credible source is available to 
support or reject the existence of these mechanisms 
4.2c  There is uncertainty about the cause or meaning of observations 
(e.g. correlations with no known causal mechanism) 
4.2d  The scope of existing studies does not match the scope needed 
for the risk assessment (e.g. the assessment involves doses, 
temperatures, lifespans significantly greater than existing 
measurements) 
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Level Ω – Ideal 
At this level there is no systematic uncertainty – the risk assessment is robust against any criticism, 
including new scientific investigation. This level is necessarily aspirational – it cannot theoretically or 
practically be achieved. Level Four risk assessments can move towards (but never reach) Level Ω 
through strong peer-review processes. Whilst most challenges raised through peer-review can be 
resolved within the risk assessment, it is almost inevitable that there will be items of uncertainty 
which could be removed in principle, but not within real-world resource constraints.  
3.3 The Maturity Model is Consistent with Criticisms of QRA 
Each flaw listed in our maturity model is based on existing literature critiquing or guiding the practice 
of QRA. In this section we expand upon each of the flaw categories of Table 1 through Table 4 to 
provide context and rationale for including the flaws in the model. Throughout this discussion the 
pronoun “we” is used to mean one or more of the authors. 
3.3.1 Failure to Provide Source Material 
Quantitative risk assessment applies scientific knowledge to a specific scenario. If only those 
conducting the assessment know the details of that scenario, then the QRA is not reviewable. This fact 
should be self-evident, but this does not prevent QRA reports frequently being supplied without 
sufficient information about the subject of the assessment. At a minimum, basic traceability is needed 
from QRA artefacts (e.g. a fault tree) to the source documents, designs and (where applicable) 
physical systems that were used when building the model. 
Often, where system information is provided, it does not contain sufficient version information to 
ensure that the QRA matches the subject system. We have found errors in a QRA, only to discover 
that the issue was “already fixed in the design” – leaving little confidence in the accuracy of the rest 
of the analysis. Effective configuration management is therefore needed, not just for the design itself 
but also for any associated QRA artefacts; it should be possible to know exactly which version of the 
design (or indeed the built system) a given QRA artefact was based on. 
Beyond the simple need to be “based on the latest design”, fine-grained traceability is valuable so that 
queries about parts of the QRA can be related directly back to the parts of the documentation and 
design that informed them. This is important, for example, if base data about individual components 
later proves to be inaccurate, or there is a need to change the design, e.g. due to obsolescence, and to 
refresh the QRA in a cost-effective manner, i.e. only modifying the affected parts of the QRA. 
3.3.2 Failure to Describe Scope and Objectives 
Human risk assessment has been shown to be sensitive to cognitive errors such as partition bias [43] 
and external signal effects [44]. In other words, the expressed purpose and evaluation criteria of the 
risk assessment can have a direct impact on the outcome; the classic case is the final risk estimate 
being “pulled” towards the acceptable side of a risk target. 
Errors of context may also result in a mismatch between the risk that is intended to be assessed and 
the risk that is actually assessed. This is of particular concern where risk assessments are conducted in 
multiple parts, and misaligned boundaries may lead to omissions or overlaps in the risk assessment 
[35].   
3.3.3 Failure to Report Methods 
Whether risk assessment is intended to be reliable – producing consistent results when followed at 
different times by different people – or merely intended to communicate the beliefs of the assessor, it 
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should still be repeatable. The process should be recorded in enough detail to allow replication or 
challenge; as part of this, the analysts should document their assumptions and any model parameters.  
Where risk assessments perform calculations, enough information needs to be available to reconstruct 
these calculations. One possible problem is incorporating calculations within macros or computer 
code without sufficient documentation to decipher the code. Where risk assessments involve the 
selection of published data, enough information about selection criteria needs to be available to judge 
whether the criteria are appropriate and have been properly applied.  
3.3.4 Failure to report results 
Whilst it may seem odd not to report results, there are occasions where the QRA records only the 
activities performed; any conclusions are reported separately, for example as a PowerPoint 
presentation accompanying delivery of the report. Haddon-Cave [45] is critical of such behaviour in 
his review of the Nimrod XV230 accident.  
3.3.5 Major problems with source data 
Quantitative analysis is limited by the quality of the input data. Perfect data is impossible, but inputs 
to the analysis should be based on the best evidence available and with transparent analysis of the 
effect of any assumptions. It is particularly problematic when assumptions, “engineering judgement”, 
or “expert opinion” are used in place of readily available data.  
Problems with the elicitation of expert opinion have been well documented (see for example Mosleh 
[43], and Fox and Clemen [43]); Richard Feynman [46] characterised science as “the belief in the 
ignorance of experts”. Ahearne suggests that a common problem with QRA is failure to “get the 
science right” [6] – that is, understanding the underlying phenomena in order to make appropriate 
estimates. 
Making “conservative” assumptions does not necessary remedy this problem. Notarianni and 
Fischbeck [47] explain that often assumptions thought to be conservative are in fact not. 
3.3.6 Major omissions in the analysis 
It is very hard to assess the completeness of any hazard analysis activity. Hazard identification is not a 
deterministic activity, and there is no possible test for completeness of any hazard list. Measuring 
performance of hazard identification as a research exercise is complicated by instances of the same 
hazard represented in different ways, and the lack of a reference list against which to compare 
identified hazards. 
In our experience there is a high incidence of QRA omitting entire categories of concerns such as 
software, human error, maintenance effects or environmental factors. In such cases the QRA may 
accurately represent the likelihood of accidents from some causes, but inaccurately communicate it as 
the likelihood from all causes. Crawford [5] reports that in the few cases where safety estimates and 
accident outcomes could be compared, the accident causes were issues that had not been quantified in 
the analysis. McDermid [22] makes similar observations across a range of safety and non-safety 
situations.  
Each strategy for achieving completeness has strengths and weaknesses. Checklists are effective at 
finding dangerous end-states that have been omitted (Carter and Smith [45]), but may not consider all 
scenarios leading to these end-states. Dynamic risk assessment techniques, which take explicit 
account of time and use executable system models, can explore a wider range of system behaviours – 
see e.g. Stroeve et al [48] contrasting multi-agent air traffic simulation with traditional event sequence 
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analysis, and Metzroth [49] contrasting dynamic event tree analysis with the classical event tree 
approach. All such techniques still rely on matching observed behaviours against previously-
identified dangerous outcomes; their main advantage is that they can express a wider range of system 
dynamics, and hence identify more paths to those outcomes. 
Proving a hazard list to be incomplete is much easier, requiring only examples of hazards which are 
real but have not been identified. Suokas and Pyy [50] compared the hazard analyses for several 
chemical process plants against the accident and incident records for those plants over the following 
years. They found significant gaps between hazards that were identified during the analysis and those 
that were identified during operation. Similarly, Carter and Smith [51] reviewed hazard analyses for 
several construction projects against the set of all hazards that could have reasonably foreseen (using a 
large database of industry-wide experience), and found significant gaps. Suokas and Pyy drew the 
further conclusion that hazard identification was strongest in the case of physical failures, and weakest 
in the case of management and design problems. 
Omitting a category of concern is not a fatal flaw if the scope of the risk assessment is adequately 
described. Apostolakis [9] notes the omission of software in some QRAs, but considers this to be a 
positive feature due to the lack of validity of software failure models.  
3.3.7 Mismatch between the risk assessment and reality 
This category covers the case where the risk analyst has failed to understand the system, or has 
performed the analysis on an incorrect (or outdated) representation of the system. It also covers cases 
where as-designed behaviour is assumed safe, but is not. Joyce and Wong [52] describe the problem 
of system behaviours which are “not non-conformant” i.e. they do not strictly contradict any 
identified requirement, but are still undesirable. A typical example is where requirements are silent on 
a particular topic, such as how to process invalid input data. They point out that behaviours which are 
consistent with requirements but also unsafe can occur even in the presence of structured safety 
programs, and therefore that merely testing against safety requirements is insufficient for safety 
assurance.  
Leveson [53] describes the Ariane 501 launch failure, the loss of the Mars Polar Lander and a United 
Kingdom chemical plant accident as industrial instances where all individual components behaved 
exactly as specified, and yet their combined behaviour led to a dangerous system state.  
A specific cause of unanticipated system behaviour is where a system behaves “as-designed” but in an 
unanticipated environment. The Fukushima loss of cooling accident [54] is an example of credible 
environmental circumstances beyond the design-basis used for QRA. The plant was designed to 
withstand a tsunami of 5.7 metres. Modelling suggested that a tsunami of 15.7 metres was credible, 
and a 14 metre tsunami caused the accident [55].  
3.3.8 Major inaccuracies in the analysis 
Inaccuracy is an issue beyond selection of source data. Errors can be introduced during the 
calculations themselves. This is particularly the case when complex tools or models are used to 
perform quantitative analysis.   
Notarianni and Fischbeck [47], in the context of fire safety, discuss the fact that models are often used 
when “fundamental requirements for the model’s validity” are not understood. If a model is used far 
outside its valid scope, its results may be worthless. 
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3.3.9 Internal inconsistency 
QRAs may contain hundreds of pages of text and diagrams [16], with contributions from many 
people. “The analysis” may in fact be a composition of multiple specific analyses. This introduces 
many opportunities for inconsistency.  
A typical example from our experience involves cross-referencing of information about hazards and 
mitigations. One section of the report described a hazard made acceptable through mitigation, 
referring to another section for more detail on the implementation of the mitigation. That second 
section in fact said that the mitigation had been abandoned due to technical problems, with no 
alternative proposed.  
3.3.10 Incorrect evaluation 
Risk evaluation is not universally part of risk assessment, but most risk assessments implicitly 
communicate the acceptability or unacceptability of risk [16]. Evaluation can be in error through 
inappropriate framing, in particular in not explicitly listing the alternatives being considered. A typical 
example is framing risk acceptance as a “yes/no” decision, where alternatives such as further 
information gathering or risk mitigation would also be within the scope of the analysis.  
We have not considered here the selection of risk evaluation criteria. This is a judgement which may 
be incorrect with respect to the legal context of a risk assessment, but cannot be determined to be 
correct or incorrect with respect to the risk assessment process model. However, given any evaluation 
criteria, it is possible to misapply those criteria. For example, it is possible to evaluate single hazard 
risks against targets when cumulative risk is specified by the criteria, or to exaggerate the cost of 
mitigations and thus bias the outcome of option comparisons. 
3.3.11 Misleading conclusions 
QRA conclusions – in particular the executive summary – must necessarily omit detail contained in 
the main body of the report. It is appropriate and useful, for example, to present the results of 
calculations whilst referring to the main body for how those results were determined. It is not 
appropriate to over-simplify the results themselves, by ignoring uncertainty or exceptions to the 
headline figures.  
An example from our experience involved a conclusion that all risks were tolerable due to available 
mitigations. In fact the main body of the report discussed mitigations only for some of the hazards. 
Whilst it may have been possible to argue that the hazards were acceptable without mitigation, this is 
not what the conclusions said – they misrepresented the detail of the report.  
3.3.12 Failure to report limitations 
Watson [56] suggests that the usable product of QRA is an expressed relationship between input and 
output estimates. The QRA report then constitutes an argument that the risk posed by a system is 
indeed the output estimate; this is similar to how a safety case argues that acceptable safety has been 
achieved. He argues, rightly, that there is no certain method by which accurate estimates can be 
derived, but that QRA can structure arguments which can then be reviewed and challenged. The 
audience of QRA thus needs to do this reviewing and challenging; if they merely accept the output 
estimates, there is no reason for confidence that they will make a good decision.  
This approach is internally consistent, and overcomes many of the epistemological problems with risk 
estimates and QRA methods. It requires, however, that QRA users communicate their results in this 
fashion, and that QRA stakeholders have the skills to interpret them properly. This expectation is not 
necessarily practicable. To take a simple example: a risk practitioner might say “the risk of an 
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accident is 1 × 10
-8
 per year if the estimated failure rates hold and the model is correct”, meaning that 
significant work is required to monitor the failure rates and validate the model. Their audience might 
simply hear “the risk of an accident is 1 × 10-8 per year”.  
3.3.13 Systematic problems with the conduct of the analysis 
It is possible for a QRA to have appropriate language, structure, and argument, but invalid content. 
This category of flaws is included in our model to account for cases where the clearest evidence of 
flaws in the QRA is the competency of those performing the analysis.  
Competency is particularly important in risk assessment because there is no inbuilt error-detection or 
correction process. Flaws can typically only be found by expert review, and there is limited evidence 
on the efficacy of such review [12]. Ahearne asserts that “the number of mathematical errors in risk 
reports is frequently based on misunderstanding how to treat uncertainty and how to calculate 
probabilities for complex interactions” [6]. Similarly, Ahearne also considers it problematic if 
personnel are unfamiliar with the physical phenomena involved, as they are more likely to misapply 
techniques for estimation and approximation. Notarianni and Fischbeck [47] report that specialist 
knowledge is particularly important when assumptions are made to support risk modelling (for 
example, as noted earlier, they show how “conservative” assumptions may in fact be wildly 
optimistic). Ferkl and Dix [14] consider expert insight essential for identifying dependencies between 
apparently independent equipment or events. 
In addition to competency regarding methods, there is a need to include appropriate stakeholders. 
Montague considers that the socially-constructed nature of risk assessment demands participation by 
those most affected by the risk [41].  Proponents of the idea that risk is a scientific absolute (see for 
example the National Academy of Sciences “Red Book” [57]) may reject the idea that ignoring the 
views of those subject to the risk is an “error”. If we accept that, however, then including any 
evaluation within a risk assessment is an error – evaluation cannot be part of the Red Book “risk 
assessment” process; it instead belongs to the “political” risk acceptance process.  
Stakeholders aside, proper conduct of QRA requires participation of operators and maintainers to gain 
a full appreciation of the risk.  
Systematic problems in the conduct of QRA can sometimes be obvious from the outputs. Crawford 
[5] describes many analyses producing results that “seemed incredible, or at best to venture into the 
unknowable”. His “record” observation is a system with estimated failure probability of 1 × 10-44. 
This figure is exceeded in our own experience (our collective record is a 1 × 10
-72
 estimate for failure-
on-demand of a mechanical containment system).  
Outputs need not be ludicrous to be suspicious. Estimates which are close to targets should also be 
questioned. The Lewis Committee [58] refers to this phenomenon as “a pervasive regulatory influence 
in the choice of uncertain parameters”. 
3.3.14 Insufficient rigor in selecting source data 
Poor source data is a serious threat to QRA validity, and sceptical critiques of quantitative risk 
assessment often emphasize the poor pedigree of the source data in practice (see Manion [20], 
Hansson [13], Apostolakis [9], and Peter [41]). Unless divergent data sources are used to triangulate 
probabilities (a rare practice in QRA), combining uncertain sources can only increase the associated 
uncertainty.  The common use of single-point data instead of more appropriate probability 
distributions compounds the use of poor source data.  
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Historical data may be poorly recorded, lack applicability, or have insufficient sample size for the 
claims made. A typical trade-off is between industry-wide data, which has greater sample size, and 
local data which has greater applicability. Favouring either could be the wrong decision. 
3.3.15 Incorrect processing of data 
Ferkl and Dix [14] refer specifically to software such as spread sheets which are designed primarily 
for financial calculations and do not process very small numbers accurately. They also highlight the 
problem of using a mean to represent a small number of data points. Ahearne [6] considers 
mathematical errors, particularly with probability calculations, to be a common problem. 
Our own experience is that inappropriate treatment of dependencies between events is the most 
common flaw in probability calculations. Performing QRA calculations requires either statistically 
independent basic events (e.g. in Fault Tree Analysis) or known conditional probabilities (e.g. when 
using Bayesian Belief Networks). If the technique assumes independence but this assumption is not 
true, top event probabilities are not valid. Violations of independence can be viewed more intuitively 
as “common-cause failures” (CCFs) – a single unidentified basic event which couples two identified 
events. The “1 × 10-72” probability in Section 3.3.13 arose from the false assumption that twelve 
restraining bolts would fail independently. 
Beer [59] reviewed 609 aircraft accident and incident reports and found that common-cause failures 
were present in 11% of the reports. The 11% included only cases where Beer could positively confirm 
the existence of CCF. Unfortunately accident reports seldom refer back to the original risk 
assessment, so this is only circumstantial evidence of weakness in the conduct of QRA. 
3.3.16 Insufficient characterisation of uncertainty 
Treatment of uncertainty goes beyond merely acknowledging uncertainties. The sensitivity of the final 
results to each uncertainty is an important part of risk assessment, and should consider all sources of 
uncertainty. In our experience this analysis is rarely presented.  
3.3.17 Shortfalls in conclusions and recommendations 
QRA is a “snapshot” of system risk at a particular time. If the system risk varies significantly over 
time, QRA can be very misleading about the actual risk of a system. Factors which threaten the 
validity of QRA as a system is used are detailed in Rae and Nicholson [42]. Of particular concern are: 
 divergence between the modelled system and the as-built system; 
 interactions between social and technical parts of the system which invalidate technical 
assumptions [60]; and  
 changes in effectiveness of mitigations over time. 
It is also inappropriate to assume that the state of knowledge over time will remain constant, 
particularly when the recommendations of the QRA themselves have the ability to shape further 
investigation.  
3.3.18 Disputed data sources 
If a QRA appropriately sources data and describes its methods clearly and explains the rules used for 
selection and rejection of data sources, a reviewer is in a position to comment on specific choices 
made using those rules.   
Instances of this are found in the details of the European Food Safety Authority Peer Review Report 
on Glufosinate [61], and the Food and Drug Administration report on gluten in food [62] where the 
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quality and relevance of particular studies are debated. Such examples are rare and commendable. It 
should be noted that we have had to go outside the traditional realm of “system safety” to find such 
examples. 
3.3.19 Insufficient scientific knowledge 
Risk assessment is shaped by our current scientific understanding of the physical world. Some gaps in 
scientific knowledge can be well defined, for example the fact that many studies into the effects of 
methyl-mercury on neurodevelopment have small sample sizes [63]. Other gaps may be unrecognised 
until we start to fill them, for example our understanding of organisational contribution to accidents 
[64].  
Elsewhere in our maturity model we have addressed the problem of failure to locate and make 
appropriate use of available data. Once these flaws are resolved there remains the possibility that a 
risk assessment remains flawed because the current state of scientific knowledge prevents better 
characterisation of the risk. Such flaws are far less serious than failing to engage with existing 
evidence – identifying these gaps may in fact be a positive outcome from a QRA exercise [9].  
3.4 We Have (Initial) Empirical Validation of our Model 
3.4.1 Our Maturity Model Should be Complete, Realistic and Appropriate 
The three important properties of a maturity model for risk assessment are completeness, realism and 
appropriateness. 
The model is complete if it covers all types of errors made in risk assessments. Perfect completeness 
is unlikely, but a more complete model is a correspondingly better guide.  
The model is realistic if the types of errors it describes closely match those actually made in the 
performance of risk assessment. If it contains a large number of hypothetical but unrealistic errors, 
this will reduce the usefulness of the model. There is an unavoidable tension between completeness 
and realism – including all possible errors requires including errors that may never be made.  
The model is appropriate if the levels are sensible; that is, if Level One errors are worse than Level 
Two errors and so forth. Including flaws that are not relevant to the usefulness of the risk assessment 
reduces appropriateness – for example, we have omitted cosmetic flaws such as spelling errors from 
our model.  
3.4.2 Testing Completeness 
We tested whether the set of flaws was complete by checking it against three sources. For 
completeness, whenever a flaw in a risk assessment was reported in any source, we checked that it 
was covered by a flaw in our set. The sources were: 
1. Academic literature describing errors made in risk assessments 
2. Published peer reviews of risk assessments 
3. The authors’ combined experience in review of risk assessments 
The academic sources are referenced throughout Section 3.3. 
The published peer reviews are: 
1. A National Academy of Sciences review of a Bio-Hazard Facility QRA [65]  
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2. A Radioactive Waste Management Associates review of a mixed-waste landfill Corrective 
Measures Study [66] 
3. An external peer review of an Office of Food Safety risk assessment of Melamine [67] 
4. An external peer review of an Office of Food Safety risk assessment of Gluten [62] 
5. The “Lewis Committee” review of the WASH 1400 Reactor Safety Study [58] 
6. The Science Advisory Board review of the Environment Protection Agency risk assessment 
of radon in drinking water [68] 
7. The Science Advisory Board review the Environment Protection Agency risk assessment of 
stratospheric modification [69] 
8. The European Food Safety Authority peer review of a QRA for glusofinate [70] 
9. The Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management by the 
National Academy of Sciences [71] 
Matching statements in these sources to flaws within our maturity model is necessarily a subjective 
coding exercise. Primary coding was performed by Rae, with a subset of the reviews independently 
coded by Alexander to guard against excessive subjectivity.  
We assert that our model is complete with respect to our sources– that there are no errors made in risk 
not covered by our model. This is based on our coding of errors of risk assessment – whenever we 
found an error reported in the literature or in a peer review, we expanded the set of errors to 
accommodate it. One caveat – there may be errors which are not in our set and which cannot be 
detected by peer review, or that rarely are detected and were not detected by the set of nine peer 
reviews we studied. 
3.4.3 Testing Realism 
To test whether the set of flaws was realistic (that it did not contain any flaws that never occurred in 
practice) we checked each flaw in our set against source type 2 above (the peer reviews). The results 
of this are shown in Table 5 – a tick indicates the flaw corresponding to the row was reported in the 
source corresponding to the column. We have also collectively encountered most of the flaws 
ourselves in instances of quantitative risk assessment. 
We assert that our model is indeed realistic – that these are all errors that real people make when 
conducting real risk assessments. All flaws were identified by at least one peer review, with two 
exceptions (2.6a and 2.9f).  2.6a is “Risk acceptance criteria (e.g. ALARP, GAMAB) are applied 
incorrectly.” None of the peer reviews was conducted in a regulatory environment which applied non-
quantitative criteria such as ALARP. Our own observations of misapplication of ALARP, however, 
lead us to believe that this is a realistic flaw. 2.9f is “Risk assessment answers the wrong question e.g. 
by limiting scope inappropriately”. This flaw is also one we have observed. 
3.4.4 Testing Appropriateness 
Finally, we assert that our model is appropriate. In particular, it can be seen that the Level One flaws 
are sufficient to prevent a reviewer commenting sensibly on the Level Two flaws – the Level One 
flaws include failures to document context, assumptions and goals, and thus render the whole risk 
assessment unreviewable (except insofar as we can say “it has fundamental problems”).  
This assertion may appear to be challenged by Table 5, which shows that some peer reviews found 
flaws across all levels. Most of these cases arose from multiple peer reviewers with dissimilar views 
on the target risk assessment. For example the peer review of the FDA gluten risk assessment [62] 
included one reviewer who found mainly Level One flaws, and another reviewer who found mainly 
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Level Four flaws. It is likely that addressing the Level One flaws would render the Level Four 
comments irrelevant. In our experience one is often aware of flaws at multiple levels in our model; 
however, the higher level ones cannot be resolved without rectifying the lower level flaws first.  
One consequence of the soundness of the level scale is that it helps make reviewing tractable – if you 
can establish that QRA has problems at a given level then looking for problems at the higher levels is 
not immediately important. 
Table 5 - Peer Review Identification of Flaws in Risk Assessments  
(numbers in the top row refer to the list of peer reviews in section 3.4.2) 
Flaw 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.1a   √       
1.1b  √   √     
1.1c  √ √    √   
1.2a    √      
1.2b         √ 
1.2c    √      
1.2d    √     √ 
1.3a √  √       
1.3b √   √ √  √   
1.4a     √     
1.4b         √ 
1.4c         √ 
2.1a √ √ √      √ 
2.1b √ √   √ √    
2.1c √ √  √    √  
2.2a  √   √     
2.2b  √   √    √ 
2.2c         √ 
2.2d √ √   √    √ 
2.2e √    √     
2.2f √ √ √  √     
2.2g  √ √  √  √   
2.3a √        √ 
2.3b √ √       √ 
2.3c √ √        
2.3d √ √        
2.3e         √ 
2.4a √ √ √     √  
2.4b √ √ √ √      
2.4c √ √   √     
2.5a  √  √      
2.5b     √     
2.5c √ √   √  √   
2.6a          
2.6b √ √    √    
2.6c  √    √ √   
2.6d √ √ √       
2.7a √   √ √  √   
2.7b √         
2.8a    √ √     
2.8b  √  √ √  √   
2.8c √ √  √   √   
2.9a  √        
2.9b √        √ 
2.9c √        √ 
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2.9d     √    √ 
2.9e     √    √ 
2.9f          
3.1a  √        
3.1b √ √        
3.1c √ √ √       
3.1d  √        
3.1e √ √  √   √   
3.1f     √     
3.1g √    √    √ 
3.2a  √        
3.2b     √  √   
3.2c     √     
3.2d     √     
3.2e √    √     
3.2f √   √   √   
3.3a √ √ √  √ √    
3.3b √ √   √     
3.3c √ √ √   √ √ √  
3.3d √   √  √ √ √  
3.4a       √   
3.4b √ √     √  √ 
3.4c √ √   √ √ √  √ 
3.4d  √       √ 
3.4e       √  √ 
4.1a    √    √  
4.1b    √      
4.1c √   √  √  √  
4.1d √     √  √  
4.2a √  √ √    √  
4.2b √  √ √      
4.2c    √    √  
4.2d   √ √  √  √  
3.5 The Maturity Model Provides a Way to Assess a Given QRA Instance 
As noted earlier, many general concerns about the validity of QRA can be assuaged for a single risk 
assessment. A risk assessor can state “My risk assessment doesn’t have that problem”, and argue their 
case. Our maturity model provides a list of flaws to look for when reviewing a QRA report, and a way 
of judging the seriousness of those flaws. 
Similarly, a competent QRA practitioner can take a fully-documented but otherwise flawed QRA and 
safely use it for a specific purpose by taking due account of the flaws. There are some aspects of QRA 
quality, however, that are common to almost all uses of QRA results. In particular, an inadequately 
documented QRA, such as one classified as Level One by our maturity model, cannot be safely used 
by anyone – the information needed to make decisions about how to use it is not there. For example, if 
a QRA report does not describe the boundary of the system under analysis (Flaw 1.2b) then using it as 
an input to any decision is dubious – the user cannot compensate for that weakness (unless they know 
from other sources what the boundary was assumed to be).  
Once a certain degree of maturity is reached (Level Two or above in our model), if a user knows the 
specific decision they are making, and is appropriately skilled in the use of QRA, then they may be 
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able to make good use of a flawed QRA. This is particularly true at Level Three and above, where the 
nature of the flaws is such that the inaccuracy they introduce can often be bounded. 
As the audience for a given result becomes wider (e.g. if it is presented in a public policy document) 
and the set of uses becomes broader (e.g. if it used for a wide variety of decisions about plant design, 
staffing, and maintenance arrangements) the range of properties that it must have increases. This 
corresponds to an increasing maturity level – at each higher level, the range of valid users and uses 
grows. 
At the (unattainable) Level Ω, a QRA could be used as if the real-world accuracy claim were true. At 
Level Four, we can approximate that, and know (from the QRA results as documented) what ways of 
doing that are valid for this particular QRA. 
3.6 The Maturity Model is a Roadmap for Research 
The maturity model may be useful at an organisational level. When improving QRA processes, 
reviewing the work of teams, or generally evaluating the cultural standards for risk assessment, the 
priority should be to get from Level One to Level Two before worrying greatly about the Level Four 
problems. There is also an analogy here with the software engineering maturity models CMM and 
SPICE, which are concerned with organisational capability – it is likely that an organisation which 
produces one or two Level One QRAs will typically produce QRAs of this quality. Put another way, it 
is likely to be more cost-effective to correct the underlying factors which lead to an organisation 
producing Level One QRAs rather than “fixing” each QRA independently.  
The model may also be useful at a scientific, discipline-wide level. It can help to prioritise empirical 
study of what processes/techniques/social structures reduce errors, increase quality, or merely make 
practitioners more critically aware of where they stand on the maturity scale. In particular, we can 
prioritise expensive empirical work such that it addresses the lowest level problems where the 
solution is not obvious.  
For example, we can easily state that documenting the method used to conduct a QRA is essential; 
this is uncontroversial, and doesn’t need research. On the other hand, we might want to study the 
value of using checklists for common flaws in fault trees, as opposed to only standard guidance for 
producing the tree. This could shed light on the extent to which the checklists shape and enhance the 
effectiveness of the method. Similarly, there are more subtle issues to do with how the system 
boundary and scope of analysis affects analysis performance – intuitively, being precise about the 
system boundary will improve analysis, but it is less clear that bounding the scope of analysis will be 
advantageous: 
 will it focus the analysts’ minds and help them to identify hazards or risks, and to do so 
efficiently? or 
 will it narrow their horizons, and lead them to miss hazards and risks in the broader context? 
It will not be straightforward to investigate such questions. The “classical” experimental method of 
comparing approaches (perhaps using groups of students) may shed some light on the issues, but will 
not provide convincing answers for complex real-world problems. Insight into the above questions 
about bounding might, however, come from reviewing hazard logs, and seeing at what stage of a 
project hazards are identified, and to what extent risk estimates change during the development 
lifecycle. This suggests that future QRA researchers will need to adopt their research practice from 
the social sciences at least as much as from the natural sciences.  
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4 Conclusions – QRA is Inadequately Validated, But We Have Defined a 
Path to Improvement 
QRA is widely used. Several strong claims are made about QRA, and are implicit if not explicit in 
every use of QRA, yet there is not adequate evidence that these claims are sound. Indeed, there is 
evidence that the strongest claim (the accuracy claim) is not true. Good evidence regarding the other 
claims could potentially be acquired, but it has not been acquired yet. Rigorous empirical study is 
needed if the claims about QRA are to be shown to be scientifically valid (or refuted). In addition to 
generic problems with QRA, each individual QRA may have its own weaknesses.  
QRA currently plays an important role in safety management. The work reported in this paper 
suggests that more scepticism about QRA is justified; more careful use of the outputs of QRA is 
needed. We raise questions about the relative utility of QRA because answering these questions will 
allow safety practitioners to improve their practice and justify allocation of resources. We are not 
arguing that QRA should not be used or that other forms of analysis should be preferred, and the 
empirical aspect of our work does not support such conclusions. We believe that QRA has an 
important role to play in system safety engineering, but to realise its benefit it needs to be conducted 
effectively and appropriately. Individual QRAs are not very amenable to empirical study, so they need 
to be evaluated by a variety of indirect means that are process- and document-based. 
To this end, we have built a maturity model for QRA, based on a comprehensive classification of how 
individual QRAs can be flawed. We have given our model some initial validation, and the version 
presented in this paper holds up well in terms of completeness and realism. The presentation of the 
model as a series of levels draws attention to the most important flaws to be prioritised, in particular 
those failures of documentation and reporting that prevent skilled QRA practitioners from working 
around the limitations of a particular analysis. 
Now that we have this maturity model, we can use it to efficiently direct process improvement and 
empirical research, and thus maybe start moving from superstition to a real science of safety risk. It 
provides a scale against which individual applications of QRA can be measured, and we can 
investigate how the maturity level by sector, by system risk level, or by the safety experience level of 
the organisations involved.  
One specific path forward will be to examine existing guidance and standards for QRA in the context 
of our maturity model. Understanding which flaws they protect against will encourage improvement 
and support standards-based claims about QRA quality.  
We do not claim, and could not demonstrate, that this maturity model will prove definitive. We hope 
and believe, however, that it will provide a stepping stone to improving one of the core practices on 
which safety engineering depends, and thus contribute to the maturing of the discipline.  
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